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Abstract 
The Odd-Even Policy is a transport rationing mechanism 
to control pollution levels by restricting the number of on-
road vehicles per day. The aim of this policy was to 
reduce the number of on-road vehicles in a day by about 
half and thereby reducing the alarming levels of pollution 
in the State of Delhi. This paper identifies existing policies 
and evaluates how effective these policy and 
management options are in sustaining ecosystem services 
in Delhi and harmonizing them with human needs.  The 
scope of this paper is restricted to the Odd-Even Policy 
implemented by the Government of Delhi in January-
February 2016, and how structural reformations and 
policy adjustments can be made to the same in order to 
make it conducive to the indigenous ecosystem services 
and with that of people‟s needs. Consequently, this paper 
studies whether the proposition stands or the objectives 
are required to be achieved through alternatives therein. 
The methodology of research engages in a comparative 
analysis of the Odd-Even policies implemented in Beijing 
and Delhi. The research findings are normative, and 
prescribe reforms to the Delhi model. Data are obtained 
from secondary sources. 
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An ecosystem is a dynamic complex of plant, animal and 
microorganism communities and the non-living environment 
interacting as a functional unit (Millennium Ecosystem 
Assessment, 2005). Ecosystem services are the benefits people 
obtain from ecosystems. These include provisioning services such 
as food, water, timber, and fibre; regulating services that affect 
climate, floods, disease, wastes, and water quality; cultural services 
that provide recreational , aesthetic, and spiritual benefits; and 
supporting services such as soil formation, photosynthesis, and 
nutrient cycling (Millennium Ecosystem Assessment, 2005). Hence, 
ecosystem services influence our security, the basic materials 
necessary for a good life, our health, our good social relations, and 
ultimately, our freedom of choice and action (Blanco & Razzaque, 
2009).    
Regulatory services are those that are benefits obtained from the 
regulation of ecosystem processes. Ecosystems both contribute 
chemicals to and extract chemicals from the atmosphere, 
influencing many aspects of the air quality. Ecosystems influence 
climates both locally and globally. At the global scale, ecosystems 
play an important role in climate by either sequestering or emitting 
greenhouse gases (Millennium Ecosystem Assessment, 2005). 
Regulating ecosystem services appear to play a critical role in 
sustaining local livelihoods and providing capacity for recovery 
and regeneration following natural disasters or social shocks 
(Bennett, Peterson, & Gordon, 2009). Cultural services are the 
nonmaterial benefits people obtain from ecosystems through 
spiritual enrichment, cognitive development, reflection, recreation 
and aesthetic experiences (Millennium Ecosystem Assessment, 
2005). In addition to being socially and culturally important, 
cultural services are often economically valuable and can provide 
substantial contributions to material well-being (Raudsepp-Hearne, 
et al., 2010).  Thus, “ecosystem services provide both the conditions 
and processes that sustain human life” (Salzman, 2006) 
The degradation of ecosystem services often causes significant 
harm to human well-being (Millennium Ecosystem Assessment, 
2005). According to a MEA report, approximately 60% (15 out of 
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24) of the ecosystem services are being degraded or being used 
unattainably, including the regulation of air quality. Human needs 
are also crucial for the effective development of citizens in our 
changing world. The use of cars to commute has come to become 
more of a necessity than a luxury. All citizens should benefit from 
the access, transport facilities provide in a reasonably equitable 
manner. This implies avoiding excessive dependence on private 
automobiles if certain sections of the society are not to be excluded 
(European Conference of Ministers of Transport). 
There is as strong correlation between ecosystem services and 
components of human well-being. The components of human well-
being include security, basic material for good life, health and good 
social relations. In specificity, there is direct relation between 
regulatory ecosystem services and the health component of human 
well-being. By health, we refer to the ability of an individual to feel 
well and be strong, or in other words to be adequately nourished 
and free from disease, to have access to adequate and clean 
drinking water and clean air, and to have the ability to have energy 
to keep warm and cool (Millennium Ecosystem Assessment, 2005).   
However, human needs do impose negative externalities on the 
environment. A negative externality is the cost on a third party (in 
this case, the environment) that results from human action. If an 
activity has a negative externality, then its cost to the society is 
more than what consumers are paying for. Whether direct or 
indirect, human action or inaction significantly affects ecosystem 
services, therefore also affecting human well-being (Blanco & 
Razzaque, 2009).Thus, the emerging pattern of economic growth 
and structure of the economy is one that is damaging to its own 
resource base and ultimately self-destroying (Chakraborty, 1997). 
Furthermore, excessive vehicular use increases greenhouse gas 
emission and results in air pollution that disrupts the equilibrium 
of the ecosystem services by affecting human well-being, 
specifically in terms of their access to clean air. Consequently 
understanding the dynamics of ecosystem services requires an 
integrated understanding of how changes in human desires and 
activities combine with ecological dynamics to produce change 
(Raudsepp-Hearne, et al., 2010). 
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Scarcity signifies the gap between people‟s material desires and a 
society‟s productive potential (Panayotakis, 2011). It is the scarcity 
of a good, relative to effective demand, that determines its 
competitive market price and hence its economic value in that 
sense. Only things like air (in most situations) and water (in some 
situations) are described by the economist as a free rather than a 
scarce good (Bronfenbrenner, 1962). As the ecosystem services are 
not scarce, the marginal value of ecosystem services are zero 
however beneficial they may be. The marginal value is calculated in 
terms of the amount someone is willing to pay for the next 
marketable unit of a good (Sagoff, 2009). As its marginal value is 
zero, people tend to exhaust this scarce resource and thereby create 
a negative social impact on their environment.  
Although people benefit from ecosystem services such as the 
regulation of air and water quality or the presence of an 
aesthetically pleasing landscape, there is no market for these 
services and no person has an incentive to pay to maintain the 
good. And when an action results in the degradation of a service 
that harms another individual, no mechanism exists to ensure that 
the individuals harmed are compensated for the damages they 
suffer (Millennium Ecosystem Assessment, 2005). Thus, if the act of 
consumption imposes costs in the form of environmental damage 
(Example: air pollution emitted by vehicular usage), these costs 
should be accounted for (Mackellar & Jr., 1989) 
This accounting for these costs is called internalising of an 
externality. “Internalizing externalities”, to ensure that resource 
prices accurately reflect actual underlying social costs and benefits, 
is a central goal of resource and environment policy. A broad range 
of policy instruments- taxes, user fees, emission permits, and so on- 
are employed to deal with externalities (Mackellar & Jr., 1989). 
Delhi‟s transport requirement includes provisions for both private 
vehicles and public transportation. The transportation system is 
undoubtedly the major force among the dynamic forces that 
influence the rate and pattern of development of the urban areas 
(Zimmerman, 1974). The city‟s high dependence on private vehicles 
has taken a toll on its public infrastructure and ecosystem services. 
Consequently, the city cannot have a sound public transportation 
system until it fixes the loopholes in the policies with regard to 
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private vehicles. Hence, the State Government is required to 
develop for Delhi a system that acts as series of incentives that urge 
people to take action by consciously regulating private vehicular 
usage and reducing the latter‟s cost on society (by reducing private 
vehicular emissions).  
Incentives are economic instruments that work through the market 
and alter the behaviour of economic agents (Pandey, 
1998).Economic incentives is a form of governmental intervention 
to reduce institutional, market and policy failures. These are those 
instruments that affect cost and benefits of alternative action open 
to economic agents, with the effect of influencing behaviour in a 
way that is favourable to the environment (Chakraborty, 1997). 
They typically involve either a financial transfer between polluters 
and the community (example, various taxes and charges, product 
taxes) or the actual creation of new markets (for example 
marketable permits) (Organisation for Economic Co-operation and 
Development, 1991).  
The equitable access and the sustainable management of ecosystem 
services largely depends on the national, legal and institutional 
framework (Blanco & Razzaque, 2009). The Odd-Even Policy of the 
Delhi Government is one such institutional framework to control 
the pollution levels in the State. 
Environmental Pollution is one of the serious problems in most of 
the mega cities of the world, especially in developing countries, 
which not only experiences a rapid growth of population due to 
increasing rate of rural urban migration but also industrialisation 
which is also accompanied by air, water and vehicular pollution 
(Nagdeve, 2004). A major source of air pollution in Delhi has been 
the ever-increasing number of automobiles that accounted for 63 
percent of air-pollutants in 1990-91 (Tang, Prakash, & Tang, 1998). 
Over the years, the intensity of the air pollution problem in Delhi is 
increasing. For example, the city produced 2,000 MT/Di of 
pollutants in 1995 as compared with an average of 1,000 MT/D 
about a decade ago. Ambient air quality has shown a consistent 
downward trend in the past decade (Government of Delhi, 1995) 
The WHOii Commission on Health and Environment recently 
concluded its work, identified air pollution as major environmental 
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health problem deserving high priority for action (World Health 
Organisation , 1992) 
On 1st January 2016iii, the Government of Delhi led by Chief 
Minister Arvind Kejriwal launched the Odd-Even model as a policy 
response to manage the city‟s changing ecosystem services. The 
Odd-Even model was a transport rationing mechanism to control 
pollution levels by restricting the number of on-road vehicles per 
day. Odd-numbered private four wheeler vehicles could ply on 
odd-numbered dates and even-numbered four wheeler vehicles on 
even-numbered dates. Consequently, the number of such vehicles 
on road in a day were to be reduced by about half.  
Studies show that the pollution levels in Delhi were less than that 
in neighbouring regions during the Odd-Even fortnight. An 
assessment by the University of Chicago and the University of 
Harvard states that the Odd-Even programme reduced particulate 
air pollution concentration by 10-13 per cent during that period 
(Kumar, 2016). Hence, this indicates that the model helped in the 
improvement of the city‟s ecosystem servicesiv.  
However, the inability to use private transport by policy 
obligations (Odd-Even Policy) combined with the limited public 
transportation infrastructure in the city led the people of Delhi to 
suffer inconvenience in order to meet their basic transportation 
needs. This shows that changes made by this transport rationing 
scheme in the institutional and environmental governance 
framework failed to be in tandem with the human needs. A rational 
decision maker takes an action if and only if the marginal benefit of 
an action exceeds the marginal cost (Mankiw, 2012). In this context, 
the Odd-Even policy‟s marginal costs outweigh its marginal 
benefits as it is difficult to adjust tastes and preferences of the 
people in the short-run. Recognising this, Chief Minister Arvind 
Kejriwal on January 1st, 2016 said that it was not possible to 
implement the Odd-Even traffic rationing scheme on a permanent 
basis (Hindustan Times, 2016)v. Ergo, it is imperative for the 
Government of India to immediately take action to solve this policy 
dilemma by harmonising ecosystem services with human needs.  
The effective resolution of this policy dilemma would help 
overcome the behavioural failure of the Odd-Even policy 
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implemented by the Delhi government. The term behavioural 
failure reflects a parallel and familiar idea of market failurevi. A 
failure arises from whatever source (i.e. market, coordination, 
behavioural) if actions or a policy does not achieve the efficient 
policy baseline as defined by the rational choice theory (Shogren, 
2012) 
This paper identifies existing policies and evaluates how effective 
these policy and management options are in sustaining ecosystem 
services in Delhi and harmonizing them with human needs.  The 
scope of this paper is restricted to being a conceptual review of the 
Odd-Even Policy implemented by the Government of Delhi in 
January-February 2016, and how structural reformations and policy 
adjustments can be made to the same in order to make it conducive 
to the indigenous ecosystem services and with that of people‟s 
needs.  
In this context, this paper seeks to study models of the Odd-Even 
Policy that have worked in other places across the globe and to 
effectively use their key performance indicators and strengths to 
help enhance the marginal benefits derived from the indigenous 
Odd-Even policy implemented by the Government of Delhi. The 
amalgamation of the strengths of the similar transport rationing 
models to cement the Odd-Even Policy of Delhi can help resolve 
the Indian policy dilemma. Several cities, including Rome, Beijing, 
Mexico City, Bogota, Paris, Quito, La Paz and San Jose have 
adopted a version of the Odd-Even model. However, this paper 
restricts itself to the study of the Beijing case. It seeks to explore the 
best practices in the Beijing‟s Odd-Even policy that can be suitably 
adopted to suit the Indian context.  
The research objective is to identify policy adjustments to the Odd-
Even Model that balances ecosystem services with human needs 
and enhances solution sustainability. It is proposed that the 
objective may be achieved by making Command and Control 
(CAC) policies and transport policies complementary to rather than 
substitutes of one another. This paper studies whether the 
proposition stands or the objectives are required to be achieved 
through alternatives therein. 
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Command and Control policies and transport policies are policy 
instruments to protect the environment from excessive pollution. 
These policy instruments can be divided into two categories: those 
that provide firms with little flexibility in achieving goals (so-called 
“command-and-control” approaches) and those that provide firms 
with greater flexibility and incentives to look for more effective 
ways of making sustained environmental progress (so-called 
market-based or incentive-based mechanisms) (Hahn & N.Stavins, 
1992). Command and Control policies constrain emission from each 
source and do not allow sources to trade the right to pollute 
(Eskeland & Jimenez, 1992). 
The development of sustainable transport policies implies 
reconciling environmental, social and economic objectives 
(European Conference of Ministers of Transport). Policies 
implemented at the urban level can play a crucial role in the extent 
to which urbanisation can translate into mobility that is less 
dependent in private modes while meeting growing mobility 
demand. This can significantly reduce negative externalities such as 
congestion, pollution and CO2 emissions (OECD, 2015).  
The methodology of research engages comparative analysis of the 
Odd-Even policies implemented in Beijing and Delhi. The initial 
analysis is qualitative, and studies the values and limitations of the 
said Odd-Even policies, highlighting their efficacy or the lack 
thereof. The research findings are normative, and prescribe reforms 
to the Delhi model. Data is obtained from secondary sources.  
Review of Literature  
As the transport network has been predominantly road-based in 
Delhi, there has been a considerable growth in the road length and 
the motor vehicles during the period 1970 to 1991. The growth in 
the number of the motor vehicles has, however, been more rapid 
than the growth of both road length and population (Appendix 1) 
(Pandey, 1998). Delhi‟s roads are already under terrible strain. If 
action is not taken immediately, that strain would become 
unbearable. And we would all pay a heavy price (Mishra, 2000). 
Therefore, transport rationing mechanisms need to be effectively 
deployed in a strategic and holistic manner. The Odd-Even policy 
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instituted by the Government of Delhi on 1st January 2016 was a 
measure to reduce the number of cars on Delhi roads and thereby 
cutting down on pollution levels in the city. 
Information on environmental characteristics can be a good guide 
in designing appropriate instruments for pollution control. It was 
noted earlier, that emission characteristics of transport vehicles 
depend on the technology, type of fuel, usage and the maintenance 
of the vehicle, operating condition, etc. However, the data on 
emission characteristics of motor vehicle fleet in Delhi or any other 
state in India is not available (Pandey, 1998). This information 
asymmetry is aided by the fact that emission rates of vehicle fleet in 
developing countries are higher owing to older vehicle fleets, using 
fuel of lower quality and poor enforcement of emission standards.  
In this context, controlling fleet size relies on demand side 
interventions like ownership restrictions or taxes on vehicles, both 
of which directly affect the economics of using private motorized 
vehicles; so do incentives for lowering the average age of the 
vehicle fleet, whether via inspections or via higher registration fees 
for older cars. The impact of such fees may be regressive since 
poorer consumers are unlikely to able to afford new cars (Pargal & 
Heil, 2000). Consequently, economists have long recognised that 
the command-and-control approach to pollution control, which 
dominates pollution policy, results in unnecessarily high costs (Lee, 
1999). Furthermore, since the fleet turnover in developing countries 
is generally much lower than in developed countries, additional 
incentives to invest in new cars, fuels or technology may be 
warranted on social welfare grounds. To the extent that fees and 
fines go towards enhancing public transportation provisions, they 
can have an additional beneficial impact (P. & mark, 2000).  
Dense urban developments, the provision of effective public 
transport and strong government commitment are often the key to 
limiting car ownership, as shown by the experience of Singapore. 
Furthermore, if public mass transit systems (including bus and rail 
services) are well-designed and efficient, commuters can be 
induced to those alternatives to private vehicles if the appropriate 
demand management policies are adopted. There is little empirical 
evidence of consumers switching from car-oriented lifestyle to 
using public transport in the absence of strong policy interventions 
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(Pargal & Heil, 2000). Therefore, in order to fill in the gap of 
effective road-rationing policy that invests in an enhanced and 
equitable public transportation system, that is accessible to all the 
citizens of Delhi, makes way for this paper which crucially charts 
out insights to the most pragmatic solution in order to fill in the 
loopholes or policy dilemma of Odd-Even policy in the current 
urban environment of Delhi. 
There is no adequate literature pertaining to the Odd-Even road 
rationing policy with special reference to the Delhi context. The 
researcher feels that it is crucial to systematically analyse the policy 
options that were effectively deployed in other cities where the 
Odd-Even policy was implemented in the past, especially Beijing 
(as considered in the case of this paper). This paper fills the policy 
void that currently exists in Delhi in order to make the indigenous 
Odd-Even policy, a tool to effectively reduce pollution and to 
initiate a public transportation system that enhances the 
infrastructural development of the State. 
Delhi’s Case 
Air quality is declining in urban areas, in part because of the rapid 
motorization of societies world-wide. To combat the problem, 
various pollution control strategies have been used or proposed for 
urban passenger transport (Pargal & Heil, 2000). The Odd-Even 
policy was implemented by the Government of Delhi to rectify the 
fluctuations in the relatively high pollution levels in the city caused 
due to enhanced vehicular pollution.  
The Supreme Court has slapped a ban on the sale of high-end 
diesel passenger vehicles till 31 March 2016, made it mandatory for 
taxis to shift to CNG fuel, doubled entry tax of trucks into the city 
and took 10-year-old commercial vehicles powered by diesel off the 
city‟s roads (Vishwanath & Raj, 2016). Such regulatory measures 
along with the existing pool of insufficient public transportation 
system makes this a formula that will result in an excessive burden 
on the existing public transport infrastructure in the city and will 
lead to increased sales of vehicles that are now eligible to ply on the 
roads of Delhi. Thus, this policy increases the consumption of the 
people and thereby allowing automobile giants to increase their 
corporate profits. Such policies of the government, rather than 
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being producer oriented or dealer oriented, are targeting the 
consumers. Such non-technical instruments aiming at consumers, 
requires behavioural adaptions either in the mode of transport or 
necessitating periodic maintenance check to minimise pollution 
levels (Kathuria, 2002).  
The judgment of banning certain vehicles along with the command 
and control measure (Odd-Even Policy) taken by Aravind 
Kejriwal‟s Government has rather ushered in action that is inverse 
of what the Court wanted the citizens to do. The Supreme Court 
judgement was taken under the knowledge of reducing the 
pollution levels in the city by banning the purchase of high-end 
diesel cars and thus leading to reduced pollution levels. In reality, 
the Odd-Even Policy does the opposite. In theory the policy should 
have halved the traffic numbers, but a host of exemptions means 
many more than half the nearly nine million vehicles registered in 
the city can still take to the roads every day (BBC, 2016). 
Furthermore, such command and control (CAC) policies tend to be 
marginally effective due to the inelastic nature of demand by the 
consumers. The road rationing formula of the Odd-Even policy did 
not impact the sale of four-wheelers during its implementation 
period in Delhi. The Delhi government announced the odd-even 
plan on December 4, 2015 and the four-wheeler sales between 
December 5th 2015 and January 10th 2016 totalled 8,298, compared 
to average sales of 7,679 vehicles in the same period over the last 
four years when the auto sector saw both a slump and a revival in 
demand (The Hindustan Times , 2016). This shows that the 
vehicular volume increased due to people‟s response to circumvent 
the road rationing policy by purchasing a second vehicle with an 
alternative number plate. 
Kaustuva Barik cites research which shows that while command-
and-control methods might yield dividends initially, but their gains 
are likely to taper off in the long run. The return of high pollution 
in Delhi after the Supreme Court made compressed natural gas 
mandatory for public transport vehicles is one such example 
(Kishore, 2016). In fact, any introduction of instruments say, 
desulphurisation or conversion of taxis from diesels to CNG might 
have resulted in immediate fall in emission levels, but over time 
with increased population of vehicles or any other factor, the 
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ambient quality may have spurted back to earlier levels. Given the 
fact that in Delhi on average nearly 370-600 vehicles are registered 
daily,vii such a possibility does exist (Kathuria, 2002). And in the 
long run, going by a similar experiment in China, Delhi may end 
up having more vehicles on the road (The Hindustan Times , 2016). 
Beijing’s Case 
Driving restrictions are used in numerous cities around the world 
to reduce pollution and congestion (Mahendra, 2008). In an attempt 
to improve the air quality of Beijing, China, before the 2008 
summer Olympics, implemented a temporary road space rationing. 
They imposed restrictions on private vehicles by allowing even and 
odd license plates to drive on alternate days with the violators 
having to cough up 200 yuan for breaking the rules (Banerji, 2015). 
The restrictions, based on license plate numbers, initially prevented 
driving every other day and later one day per week (Viard & Fu, 
2013). On the benefits side, we find that the restrictions 
significantly reduce particulate matter, a pollutant estimated to 
claim 6.4 million life-years annually worldwide (Cohen, 2005). As a 
result, the traffic volume was reduced by approximately 32% 
during the source control period (Wang T, 2009). 
Along with imposing the Odd-Even policy in Beijing, other 
pollution relevant policies were imposed to complement the 
driving restrictions. These included bus fare reduction and subway 
line openings (Viard & Fu, 2013). The total utility derived by the 
people of Beijing amidst these restrictions was high due to an 
extensive and well connected public transportation system and 
expansion of its transit capacity. Beijing added subway capacity 
during the time when it imposed the Odd-Even Policy, so as to 
compensate the impact of people‟s substitution from auto to public 
transport.  
In the short run people respond to such policy incentives by 
purchasing new cars. The number of vehicles in Beijing increased 
by 13% per year, with 4 million vehicles in 2009 (Wu, et al., 2011). 
However as sharing cars is difficult, purchasing a second vehicle 
with a different plate number to satisfy the restrictions is 
prohibitively expensive for most residents as is purchasing a first 
vehicle in response to the reduced auto congestion created by the 
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restrictions (Viard & Fu, 2013). The high cost involved in the 
purchase of a vehicle incentivises people reduce the consumption 
of cars and switch to public transportation as a regular means of 
transportation. Effective monitoring by traffic surveillance cameras 
and high penalties to prospective defaulters helped the Beijing‟s 
Odd-Even Policy to materialize on the ground level and show its 
desired results. As incomes in China increase, demand for driving 
will increase so will the number of cars (Duranton, 2011)viii. Thus, 
to keep auto pollution levels constant may require further increases 
in driving costs ( Example : Odd Even Policy). To the extent that 
sharing vehicles is costly, this will keep average driving costs high 
and reduce the equilibrium number of cars (Viard & Fu, 2013). 
However, this isn‟t the most efficient way to reach equilibrium. A 
more effective allocation would result from increasing vehicle 
license fee or pricing congestion. Beijing has moved in this 
direction, beginning to limit the number of new car registrations in 
December 2010 (Viard & Fu, 2013).  
As a temporary measure, the Odd-even rule drastically reduced air 
pollution and traffic jams in Beijing. But the measure cannot be 
made a permanent fixture. A car is a legal private property of a 
citizen, and if the government bans someone from using their car 
on certain days of the week it will infringe upon a person‟s 
fundamental rights. Moreover, the fourth Plenum of the 18th 
Central Committee of the Communist Party of China emphasised 
the rule of law, and no law entitles the government to permanently 
force half of the vehicles off the road. Therefore, Article 39 of the 
Road Traffic Safety Law should be applied only in temporary 
situations (Yang, 2014). Therefore, it is imperative to formulate 
long-term road rationing mechanisms that don‟t infringe on the 
rights of the individuals and also make mobility efficient by 
widespread public transit connectivity.    
Furthermore, strategies for reducing PAHix emissions from 
vehicles in Chinese megacities, and associated inhalation cancer 
risk, include the development and encouragement of public 
transportation and more stringent vehicle emission standards (Wu, 
et al., 2011).  
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Comparative Review of Delhi’s and Beijing’s Case  
Although CAC measures like the Odd-Even Policy was initiated 
and enacted in both Delhi and Beijing, their impact differed as they 
were implemented differently. Taking the case of Beijing, along 
with imposing the Odd-Even policy, other pollution relevant 
policies were imposed to complement the driving restrictions. 
These included bus fare reduction and subway line openings 
(Viard & Fu, 2013). Therefore, the general public were incentivized 
to use public transport. Furthermore, Beijing added subway 
capacity during the time when it imposed the Odd-Even Policy, so 
as to compensate the impact of people‟s substitution from auto to 
public transport. 
On the other hand, when the Odd-Even Policy was implemented in 
Delhi, it was done so in the isolation of other such policy incentives 
that made public transportation a cheaper and a more economically 
convenient way to travel. Rather than making public transportation 
system reliable and attractive enough to encourage the car users to 
shift to public transport, surge pricing by cab aggregators like Ola 
and Uber, made transportation more costly than before. 
Furthermore, the capacity of the Delhi metro remained the same 
and the excessive commuters added to the strain of the limited 
public infrastructure.  
On the air quality front, the Delhi‟s Odd-Even scheme has 
provided limited benefits. This can be attributed to the fact that the 
share of private cars is small in the production of PM2.5 levels in 
Delhi (source apportionment study, IIT-K), and consequently, only 
marginal reductions could be achieved through the Odd-Even 
scheme. In winters, the Odd-Even experiment led to a ~7% 
reduction in the 24-hour PM2.5 concentrations; however, in 
summers, when the pollution levels are relatively lower and the 
share of vehicular sources is lower too, the impact of the scheme is 
further reduced (The Energy and Resources Institute, 2016). 
In summation, it can be sought that even the second phase of Odd-
Even Policy couldn‟t successfully limit the level of pollution in the 
state of Delhi. This can be inferred from the fact that the air 
pollution levels in Delhi rose by 23 percent during the second 
phase of the odd-even registration rule, from April 15 to April 29, 
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over the previous 14 days (April 1 to April 14), based on an analysis 
of PM (particulate matter) 2.5 data (Business Standard, 2016). 
Policy Formulation 
For India, the outcomes of the urban scenarios through modal 
shares show very contrasting trend for different scenariosx. In the 
baseline scenarioxi, the modal share of private cars increases from 
32% in 2010 to 59% in 2050, to the detriment of the public transport 
(from 42% to 22%) (Appendix 2). This shows that the natural 
evolution of mobility pattern in urban India is towards private 
mobility (OECD, 2015). This trend forecast brings forward, in the 
context of Delhi, the importance of transport regulation 
mechanisms, transport policies and an effective policy implication 
with an enhanced technological capability and reach.  
The limitation of this research is that we tend to look at how to 
combat the increasing CO2 levels in Delhi without sufficiently 
tackling the problem of congestion. Furthermore, another limitation 
of this research is that most policy solutions offered as response to 
combat the high pollution levels caused due to the Odd-Even 
policy tend to be socialistic in nature as this topic is subsumed 
under the broader category of sustainable development and 
growth.  
 Government agencies responsible for enforcing environmental 
laws can justify larger budgets under a command-and-control 
approach because it requires more detailed involvement in 
pollution control decisionsxii.That the larger benefits from the 
incentive approach would spread those benefits over everyone in 
the general public does nothing to offset the political advantage of 
the command-and-control approachxiii (Lee, 1999). 
 “U.S. environmental policies, which are primarily of the command 
and control method, move society onto a higher marginal 
abatement cost curve than is necessary…Because of the high 
abatement costs, it is likely that the target level of pollution that is 
chosen will be greater than the optimal level of pollution” (Kahn, 
1995). Consequently, the efficient level of pollution would be less 
with a policy of economic incentives than with higher marginal 
abatement costs of the command-and-control approach (Lee, 1999). 
In India, so far there has been an overwhelming reliance on CAC 
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measures (Pandey, 1998). The Odd-Even policy is one such 
command-and-control measure whose implementation in Delhi has 
led to an increase in the marginal cost of abatement.     
The Odd-Even Policy is an initiative by the Government of Delhi 
whose unintended consequences outweighs its intended 
consequences. According to the principles of economics all human 
beings are said to be rational individuals and they seem to respond 
to incentives. The incentive of the Odd-Even policy can lead to 
unintended consequences that may rather lead to the disutility of 
policy framework and increased consumption expenditure by the 
public. If instruments require scrapping of old vehicles, simply 
mandating sales of new clean vehicles does not fully address the 
ambient air quality problem. This is because it still remains 
unknown on who will purchase the vehicles, where they will be 
living (whether highly polluted or cleaner regions), or how much 
will they drive the vehicles once purchased (Kathuria, 2002). 
Hence, the effective policy formulation of the Odd Even Policy by 
the Government of Delhi tends to backfire on its expected results as 
it creates a negative obligation for the citizens and also encourages 
them to purchase a second vehicle with an alternative number to 
help them circumvent the rule, thereby promoting sales of the 
automobile firms. 
Free market forces is the key guiding factor that brings the supply 
and demand for goods and services into a state of equilibrium. The 
use of policy incentives (command-and-control measure), like the 
Odd-Even policy thus increase the marginal cost of abetment and 
reduce the optimum utilisation of resources. Such a policy gives the 
citizens of Delhi an incentive to purchase an additional car so that 
they don‟t face the disutility of deriving only partial satisfaction 
from their first car due to the government‟s Odd- Even Policy. This 
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This unintended nature of the Odd-Even policy dilutes its intended 
purpose. As incentives alter the decision making capability of an 
individual, any policy that increases the cost of maintaining a car 
decreases its utility and reduces satisfaction among the people.  
Market based policies can help us to solve this policy dilemma of 
how to enhance our utility and efficiency and at the same time 
control the levels of air pollution. Market based policies will not 
only be cost-effective (in a static sense), but will also provide 
dynamic incentives for the development and adoption of improved 
pollution controlled technologies (Hahn & N.Stavins, 1992). 
Market-based incentives generally require the regulator to estimate 
only aggregate (rather than individual) costs of abatement to 
minimise costs. A regulator would, for instance, issue enough 
tradable permits for the marginal benefits and costs of abatement to 
be equated overall; a polluter whose abatement costs are high 
would purchase permits, whereas one with cheaper abatement 
options would prefer to reduce emissions. A pollution tax can also 
achieve cost effective abatement. It allows each polluting source to 
decide whether to pay the tax or to undertake additional 
abatement, with the result that low-cost abatement is selected since 
each source will abate only if the marginal costs of abatement do 
not exceed the tax rate (Eskeland & Jimenez, 1992).  
In developing countries, where the tax base is often narrow and 
rates high, distortionary costsxiv are likely to be higher (World 
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while improving efficiency, by persuading firms and households to 
reduce negative externalities. Taxing commodities with negative 
externalities will thus reduce not only the efficiency losses arising 
from the externality itself (say, damage from pollution) but also the 
efficiency losses related to generating revenue, since the proceeds 
may allow other rates to be reduced (Eskeland & Jimenez, 1992).  In 
this context, economic incentives like higher tax on the second car 
per family and initiation of congestion tax can considerably change 
the consumption patterns of most families in Delhi by increasing 
their costs. The heart of the public transportation problem is 
financial (Zimmerman, 1974). Barik argues that using economic 
incentives, such as a congestion tax, would yield double dividends 
in terms of reducing traffic as well as generating additional 
revenue, which could be used to augment public transport. A tax of 
Rs 1000 per month on cars and Rs 500 per month on two-wheelers 
(taking into account just vehicles registered in Delhi) can generate a 
tax of more than Rs 6,700 crore, according to Barik‟s calculations. 
Such funds can be used to revamp the city‟s public transport 
infrastructure, and ensure last-mile connectivity for daily 
commuters, reducing the demand for cars in the city (Kishore, 
2016). In most developing countries, input taxes to curtail 
emissions would be easier to implement than a completely new 
scheme such as permit trading (Eskeland & Jimenez, 1992). 
Furthermore, if people behave as if they are “addicted to” the good 
generating the negative environmental impact an optimum 
environmental tax should exceed the standard Pigouvian Taxxv. 
Analogously, encouraging less-environmentally damaging 
substitute behaviour might be achieved through policies that 
incorporate mechanisms which provide incentives to pre-
commitxvi (Shogren, 2012)  
The Odd-Even Policy has resulted in lacklustre improvements in 
the pollution levels of Delhi. The search for new instruments 
should recognize that appropriate mechanisms will vary 
depending on the relevant government agency‟s resources and 
capabilities (Hahn & N.Stavins, 1992). 
We have formulated a model that will assist the policymakers to 
overcome the policy dilemma and make the Odd-Even Policy a 
bulletproof formula. We propose a model where command and 
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control policies like (Odd-Even policies) are accompanied by a 
reduction in public transportation fares, thereby making public 
transit convenient and allowing more people to use it and a strict 
implementation of transport policies. These transport policies will 
include initiating cordon/congestion pricing, reworking on 
parking policies, putting a ceiling on the number of cars registered 
in Delhi (initiating carrying capacity), making the pollution charges 
regulation stricter, implementing stricter vigilance facilities and 
creating pedestrian zones. As the CAC policies make using cars 
more costly, a simultaneous reduction in the fares of public 
transportation helps peoples people change their preferences with 
change in prices and expectations. Dense urban developments, the 
provision of efficient public transport and strong government 
commitment are often the key to limiting car ownership, as shown 
by the experience of Singapore (Pargal & Heil, 2000). 
Our model uses transport policies as exogenous variables that play 
a crucial role in influencing the means of transportation that people 
take. To some extent congestion is a form of rationing that reflects 
the absence of pricing mechanism for road space. In some places 
chronic congestion is the result of under-investment in road 
capacity over a prolonged period. Frequently, it results from a 
failure to integrate land-use and transport planning (European 
Conference of Ministers of Transport). The national capital Delhi is 
a case in point. To eradicate the problem of congestion we need 
policies that improve traffic flows and increase average speed. 
These can be achieved by a set of policies; a.) Direct action to 
reduce the number of the vehicles on the road via quotas, 
restrictions on ownership and road pricing or congestion pricing; 
b.) Efficiency enhancement, through changes in road infrastructure 
(Bus lanes, synchronization of traffic, etc.); c.)By increasing the 
supply of roads (Pargal & Heil, 2000). In an urban centre like Delhi, 
“options b” and “option c” will not be viable as Delhi has 
exhausted all its land and there is no further scope of expansion 
within the city. However, the first option of road or congestion 
pricing can effectively be employed in densely vehicular populated 
region like Delhi. Congestion pricing means that private 
automobiles entering central business districts (CBDs) like 
Connaught Place, Nehru Place, ITO, etc. will have to pay a charge 
(Mishra, 2000). If this policy initiative was to be used singly then it 
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wouldn‟t create as much impact as it would have made if it was 
executed along with CAC measures and reduced public 
transportation fares. In this policy solution, the congestion can be 
seen as disincentive for people and the only benefit that the people 
will get is a slight reduction of the vehicular population on the 
roads. Therefore, the cost of congestion outweighs the slight 
reduction of vehicular traffic in certain traffic districts.  
Regulatory measures need to be restructured to act as instruments 
of internalisation of the high cost of vehicular pollution. The short-
run impacts could be minimised by gradual introduction and set-
up to optimal rates allowing time for adjustment (Chakraborty, 
1997).The parking policy of Delhi can be reworked by hiking the 
parking charges in CBDs and institutional areas to discourage 
private automobiles. Furthermore, the parking rates should be 
levied on an hourly basis rather than being levied at flat rates. This 
will increase the maintenance cost of private vehicle and thereby 
making its marginal cost more than its marginal benefit. The other 
aspect of parking policy would entail higher charges for on-street 
parking than off-street parking. This requires the government to 
make much more by way of parking facilities than is available at 
present. This would go a long way in removing the haphazard 
parking on the roads, which contributes immensely to congestion 
(Mishra, 2000). However, the creation of additional parking 
facilities will not be viable as Delhi has exhausted all its land and 
there is no further scope of expansion within the State. 
Pollution charges may yield more or less the than what is needed 
for environmental expenditures, so the benefits of earmarking 
should be examined in the broader context public expenditure 
analysis (McCleary, 1991). On similar lines, an environment 
compensation charge of Rs 1,300 on heavy commercial vehicles and 
Rs 700 on light trucks, which enter the Capital were levied, starting 
from October 7th 2015 (Nair, 2015). This, however, only makes 
people to pay for the pollution that they generating, it doesn‟t 
really reduce the vehicular emissions. In practice, monitoring 
damages or even emissions at the source may be costly, particularly 
in developing countries, for technological and institutional reasons 
(Eskeland & Jimenez, 1992).   
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We propose initiating a mechanism of carrying capacity which 
restricts the number of private vehicles that are registered in Delhi. 
This ceiling will help in bringing down the number of cars by way 
of government decree. However, by restricting the number of cars 
that come on the roads every year, is a policy, acts as a catalyst for 
allowing bribes and under-the-table transactions to facilitate more 
licence permits than the ceiling amount.  
Furthermore, we propose the creation of pedestrian zones where 
only citizens can walk to commute and no such vehicle should be 
permitted within the vicinity of these zones. Areas in the Delhi that 
can be converted into pedestrian zones include Lajpat Nagar, 
Chandni Chowk and Connaught Place Inner Circle. However, the 
practicality of this can be questioned as it will lead to urban 
planning problems in a highly populated city like Delhi. 
In order for the above mentioned transport policies to function in 
communion with the CAC policies like Odd-Even policy in Delhi 
vigilance is of prime importance. Therefore, to ensure the proper 
implementation of these transport and command-and-control 
policies in Delhi, increased installation of CCTV cameras across the 
roads and CBDs of Delhi is necessary.  
In addition to these market incentives and fiscal policy measures, 
we propose a model whereby the Adhaar card be linked to the 
purchase of fuel of each citizen of Delhi. With the Adhaar card 
being given a statutory status under the auspices of the Union 
Budget 2016-17, the Adhaar card can now be used to assess and 
record the fuel purchases of each individual and also restrict 
excessive use by putting a ceiling on the amount of fuel each 
individual can consume in a month. If people consume more than 
the compliance amount then a surcharge would be waived on each 
litre of fuel that may consume. As fuel and cars are complementary 
goods, the regulated usage of the former can lead to more prudent 
use of vehicles. Such form of indirect tax, if initiated, can help 
control the problem of air pollution in the long run.  
Economic growth and environmental balance do not go hand in 
hand. Rather, they oppose each other. Higher economic growth 
requires natural resources to be exploited. Environmental balance 
can only be obtained if there is less or no pollution. For a 
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developing country like India to completely stop polluting is 
something that is too utopian to be true. However, what we can do 
is that can do is go for a sustainable growth model whereby our 
societal costs are at the minimum. We propose a model where 
command and control policies like (Odd-Even policies) are 
accompanied by a reduction in public transportation fares, thereby 
making public transit convenient and allowing more people to use 
it and a strict implementation of transport policies. 
Furthermore, we can reach equitable growth and development by 
shifting to cleaner technologies. The transitioning of our 
transportation sector from its near sole dependence on oil to 
electricity can lead to big reductions in carbon pollution along with 
improvements in air quality (NRDC, 2015). The Government of 
Delhi can incentivize the production of Plug-in Electric Vehicles 
(PEV) by giving them tax breaks and easier regulatory clearances. 
This ease in the production process will help in reducing the costs 
of the electric cars in India and consequently help in bring down 
the costs of PEV as compared to fuel run vehicles. This will 
encourage consumers to purchase cars with cleaner technologies 
and lesser externalities, at the cost of a normal car. This policy 
initiative of the government will not only help to boost the industry 
of electric cars but it will also help to cut down the ambient 
pollution levels in the city.  
The road- rationing policy mechanism in Delhi has taken a chaotic 
start. In order for this chaotic start to conclude logically and 
efficiently, long-term strategies are crucial to harmonise eco-system 
services with human needs. 
While the number of deaths from outdoor air pollution fell by 4% 
in OECD countries between 2005 and 2010, partly due to stricter 
vehicular emission controls China and India have seen increases of 
5% and 12%, respectively. Health impact costs of outdoor air 
pollution in China and India in 2010 were estimated at USD 1.4 
trillion and 0.5 trillion, respectively (OECD, 2015). Although 
increased vehicle activity typically degrades air quality, stringent 
vehicle emissions and fuel standards in place in many developed 
countries have decoupled the relationship between vehicle activity 
and emissions since most advanced emission controls can 
effectively eliminate over 90 percent of the local air pollutants from 
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engines (Chambliss, S. et al., 2013) The leapfrogging, by the 
Ministry of Road Transport & Highways, from BS-IVxvii to BS-VI 
emission norms directly by April 1st 2020 would act as a productive 
measure to reduce vehicular pollution in India in the long-run (HT 
Media, 2016).   
This paper shows that an integrated policy aiming at climate and 
health objectives work best, and it is possible to achieve substantial 
climate change mitigation, less reliance on private car and lower 
health impacts by promoting low sprawl and road development, 
and higher rates of public transit alongside more stringent controls 
for vehicle emissions. More specifically, results also show that for 
all regions analysed, increasing the share of public transport in 
urban mobility will only bring significant health benefits if coupled 
with regulations that assure improvement in emission control 
technologies for buses (OECD, 2015). The most efficient approach 
to achieving sustainable development of the transport sector 
requires a combination of regulatory instruments and restructuring 
of charges and taxes on the basis of marginal costs to provide 
incentives to reduce external costs to optimum levels (European 
Conference of Ministers of Transport). Ergo, a mix of CAC policies 
along with reduced public transportation costs and effective 
implementation of transport policies can help to bring down the 
pollution levels in Delhi in the short-run (This is effectively shown 
in Model 2).  By coaxing people out of their cars and with increase 
of safer and convenient public transit ridership, cities can reduce 
emissions and air pollution and enjoy safer and more liveable 
urban environments, with less time wasted in congestion (Gupta, 
2016). The long-term strategies to harmonise ecosystem services 
with human needs will be possible in the next five years‟ time as 
Delhi would be technologically equipped to carry out a plan that is 
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Figure 1 Model shares under different policy scenarios in Indian cities. 2010 and 2050 
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 Statistics source: (OECD, 2014) 
End Notes 
                                                          
i       MT/d: Metric tonnes per day 
ii     World Health Organisation 
iii  The Odd-Even Policy was implemented in Delhi for a period of 15 
days (From 1st January 2016 – 15th January 2016). 
iv  It may be noted that the data available on the National Air Quality 
Index website did not show any change in the pollution levels in the 
Year Population  
( Lakh) 








1970-71 40.66 2.04 8231 24.78 
1980-81 62.20 536 14316 37.44 
1990-91 93.70 18.13 21564 84.08 
1995-96  26.29   
Growth Rates (Per cent)  
1971-1981 4.34 10.14 5.69  
1981-1991 4.18 12.96 4.18  





                                                                                                                                    
week when the Odd-Even policy was being tested. In fact, petitioner 
Gunjan Khanna stated, “There is no reasonable nexus between this 
policy and the objective of curbing pollution” (Mathur, 2016); The 
Delhi government in its press statement claimed that air pollution 
levels continued to decline until 12th January 2016 (The Times of India, 
2016). 
v    Arvind Kejriwal stated that these were just weapons that are used on a 
temporary basis to curb dangerous levels of pollution (Hindustan 
Times, 2016). 
vi Market failure is a circumstance where the pursuit of private interest 
does not lead to an efficient use of society‟s resources or a fair 
distribution of society‟s goods (McCurdy, 1999) 
vii A report says that in 1999, 370 vehicles were registered every day. 
(Source: The Hindustan Times, October, 1, 2000). Another report says 
that on average 600 vehicles are registered every day in Delhi (Source: 
http:// www.htpcindia.com/lpgfuel.html). 
viii Duranton and Turner (2009) provide empirical evidence that a 
fundamental law of auto congestion holds, in which a natural level of 
congestion is reached in the long run which equates driving demand 
and average cost of commuting as determined by road capacity  
ix    PAHs are widespread environmental pollutants that are formed in the 
combustion process of carbonaceous materials at high temperature 
(Nikolaou, Masclet, & Mouvier, 1984). Emissions from traffic have 
been found to be the main outdoor source for the indoor PAH 
concentration at urban and suburban locations in many industrialized 
countries (Dubowsky, Wallace, & Buckley, 1999). Motor vehicle 
emissions account for around 46–90% of the mass of individual PAHs 
in ambient air particles in urban areas (Tonne, Whyatt, Camann, 
Perera, & Kinney, 2004). 
x   These scenarios imply land-use scenarios. Land use scenarios refer 
again to different evolutions of urban density. Urban density plays a 
role in infrastructure development through its impact on road 
provisions (OECD, 2015)   
xi   In the Baseline scenario, the coefficients are computed using all cities 
from each city category. In this scenario, the average urban density in 
Indian cities is 30% higher in 2050 than in 2010.  
xii As observed in The Economist (1991:28),”The EPA exists to regulate 
things, not to see the market do the job for it.” (The Economist, 1991) 
xiii Becker (1983, 1985) develops a model of political competition in which 
more efficient policies have an advantage over less efficient ones. But 
Becker‟s model doesn‟t consider the distortions caused by differences 
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in the political influence of groups with opposing interests. (Becker, 
1983) 
xiv The „excess burden‟, or distortionary cost, of a tax is thus the extent to 
which the total money measure of the welfare loss from the tax 
exceeds the tax paid (John). 
xv Since A.C. Pigou‟s (1920) seminal contributions, the expression 
“Pigouvian taxes” has been used for taxes intended to discourage 
activities with negative externalities. The “polluter pays” principle, as 
defined by the OECD guidelines (Organisation for Economic Co-
operation and Development , 1975) is not a “true” Pigouvian 
instrument, because it usually requires payment for abatement but not 
for damages from emissions.The Pigouvian prescription for correcting 
an externality is to levy a tax equal to its marginal social damage 
(Cremer & Ladoux, 2001).  
xvi Less environmentally damaging behaviour includes commuting via 
public transport or cycling. In policy terms this might include a 
stream of benefits such as subsidies (Pargal & Heil, 2000) which are 
dependent on habitual use (Shogren, 2012) 
xvii Introduced in the year 2000, the Bharat norms are emission control 
standards put in place by the government to keep a check on air 
pollution. Based on the European regulations (Euro norms), these 
standards set specifications/limits for the release of air pollutants 
from equipment using internal combustion engines, including 
vehicles. Typically, the higher the stage, the more stringent the norms. 
The BS IV norms were introduced in 13 cities apart from the National 
Capital Region from April 2010. Currently, BS IV fuel is being made 
available across the country in stages, with the entire nation expected 
to be covered by April 1st 2017 (Vardhini, 2016). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
